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ABSTRACT
In this paper we provide a novel approach to the analysis of
buyer-seller watermarking protocols by tailoring an existing
formal technique that has not previously been used in this
context. We accurately represent a buyer-seller watermark-
ing protocol as proposed by Ibrahim et al. [6] by constructing
a model using the process algebra CSP. By describing our
model in this manner and utilising the tool support associ-
ated with CSP we are able to conduct a thorough analysis
of all the possible behaviour in the protocol. Through for-
mal analysis we have discovered an unbinding attack on the
protocol. In this paper we also highlight other weaknesses
that exist in the protocol and propose veriﬁable solutions to
correct these weaknesses.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.6 [Computing Methodologies]: Simulation and Mod-
elling; E.m [Data]: Miscellaneous—Digital Watermarking
General Terms
Security, Veriﬁcation
Keywords
Buyer-Seller Watermarking Protocol, Formal Model, Formal
Analysis, CSP, Unbinding, Customers’ Rights
1. INTRODUCTION
Multimedia content is vulnerable to large scale copying
and redistribution through easily accessible networks. Copy-
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right owners wish to deter such activity, detect it when it
occurs and even trace the original perpetrator. Digital wa-
termarking schemes aim to imperceptibly embed an iden-
tifying mark within the multimedia content itself [2]. The
object of a robust watermarking scheme is to make it im-
possible to remove the mark without using the appropriate
extraction algorithm and corresponding key.
Much attention has been paid to the protection of the
rights of the seller during transactions involving copyrighted
content [3]. Qiao and Nahrstedt [10] ﬁrst identiﬁed the in-
adequacy of existing watermarking procedures when con-
sidering a customer’s rights. Memon and Wong [9] pro-
posed a solution to the customers’ rights problem and subse-
quently many authors have identiﬁed other desirable prop-
erties and constructed protocols to satisfy them [1], [14].
Buyer-seller watermarking protocols are now expected to
satisfy the following security properties: copy deterrence,
customers’ rights, unbinding, protocol practicality, conspir-
acy, buyer participation, and resilience to man-in-the-middle
attack.
This paper demonstrates how a formal modelling tech-
nique can be used to identify any failure to meet the security
requirements of such buyer-seller watermarking protocols. If
all desired security requirements are satisﬁed by the proto-
col we say that the protocol is secure. This is the notion
of security we shall use throughout this paper. The formal
modelling technique we use is Communicating Sequential
Processes (CSP) [5] which has a mathematical foundation
and can be used to provide precise, compact and unam-
biguous high-level models of systems. CSP has been used
to model many cryptographic and communication protocols
and has helped ﬁnd several successful attacks and ambigu-
ities in published security protocols [12]. A common ex-
ample is Lowe’s Man-in-the-Middle attack on the Needham
Schroeder Public Key protocol [8].
The ﬁrst contribution of this paper is the formal model we
have developed of the Ibrahim et al. protocol. Our second
contribution is the formal analysis of this model and the
unbinding attack on the protocol that our analysis uncovers.
By assuming that the underlying watermarking is perfectly
secure we are able to abstract away from the watermarking
layer and analyse the protocol alone. If the protocol is found
to be insecure the overall system is insecure.
We start by deﬁning the CSP, cryptography and water-
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marking notation, used throughout this paper, in Section 2.
Section 3 gives the necessary background to buyer-seller wa-
termarking protocols, discusses the protocol proposed by
Ibrahim et al. and describes each security requirement the
protocol aims to satisfy. We deﬁne our model in Section 4
and provide the formal analysis of the model in Section 5,
including details of an unbinding attack as found by the
model checker FDR [13]. A second unbinding attack and a
relevant revision to the protocol are described in Section 6.
Section 7 then discusses the contribution of our work and
how it may be generalised. This ﬁnal section also suggests
ideas for related work and areas of interest for further read-
ing.
2. NOTATION
2.1 CSP
CSP is a process algebra for describing models of inter-
acting systems. A system model is described as a process
(or collection of processes). CSP processes are deﬁned in
terms of the events that they can and cannot do. Processes
interact by synchronising on events, and the occurrence of
events is atomic. The set of all events is denoted by Σ. The
set of events of a process P is denoted by αP .
Events may be compound in structure, consisting of a
channel name and some (possibly none) data values. Thus,
events have the form c.v1...vn , where c is the channel name
associated with the event, and the vi are data values. The
type of the channel c is the set of values that can be associ-
ated with c to produce events.
For example, consider the channel name comm and
agents × agents × messages as its type, where agents is
a set of agents, involved in some message exchange that
may send and receive messages over comm, and messages is
the set of all possible messages that the senders may wish
to transmit along the comm channel. The events associ-
ated with comm will be of the form comm.s.r .m, where
s ∈ agents, r ∈ agents, and m ∈ messages. For example,
comm.Bob.Sam.message1 is one such event.
The syntax of CSP provides several operators for mod-
elling processes.
P ::= a → P |c?x !v → P |P1  P2|
i
Pi |S(p)
where a is an event, c is a communication channel accepting
inputs and sending output values, x is a data variable, v is
a data value, and S(p) is a process expression.
The process a → P is initially prepared to engage in an a
event, after which it behaves as P . The process c?x !v → P is
prepared to accept any value for x along channel c, provides
v as output, and then behave as P (whose behaviour can
be dependent on x). The external choice process P1  P2
is initially prepared to behave either as P1 or as P2, and
the choice is resolved on occurrence of the ﬁrst event. This
can be generalised for an indexed set of processes: 
i
Pi
chooses a process from an i-indexed set of processes P . The
process expression S(p) expresses a recursive call. Finally,
processes can be deﬁned using (recursive) deﬁnitions of the
form S(p) =̂ P .
Processes can be combined together using composition op-
erators: parallel ‘‖’ and interleaving ‘|||’. During the analysis
phase, we also make use of the hiding operator ‘\’. The pro-
cess P ||| Q means that none of the events from P and Q
synchronise. When processes run in parallel they must syn-
chronise on common events (otherwise the events can occur
independently). For example, in the parallel process:
a → b → Stop ‖ b → c → Stop
a and c can occur independently of the other process, but the
occurrence of b requires both processes to synchronise. We
use the alphabetised parallel operator, and its indexed ver-
sion, which explicitly states the alphabets of the processes,
i.e., in P |[αP ‖αQ ]| Q . The intersection of αP and αQ is
the set of events that requires synchronisation. In this paper
we omit the alphabets for clarity of presentation.
There are three semantic models in CSP which enable us
to describe process behaviour and in this paper we use the
simplest model, i.e. the traces model. Full details of the
models can be found in [11]. The traces model captures
the traces of events which a CSP process might exhibit. A
sequence tr is a trace of a process P if there is some execution
of P in which exactly that sequence of events is performed.
The empty trace, containing no events, is written 〈〉. More
generally, a trace may be written as a sequence of events
〈e1, e2, . . . , en 〉.
CSP has a theory of reﬁnement that enables us to compare
the behaviour of processes. If a process P is reﬁned by a
process Q , then all of the possible behaviours of Q must
also be possible behaviours of P . In this paper we will make
use of trace reﬁnement checks: P T Q .
The modelling of systems in CSP and their formal veriﬁ-
cation is supported by model checking tools, such as FDR.
FDR can automatically check whether a speciﬁcation of a
property (P) is satisﬁed by a proposed model (Q). If the re-
sult of a check is negative a counter example is given which
provides information on the behaviour of the model which
leads to the violation of the property. In this paper we will
encode desired properties of the buyer-seller watermarking
protocol as CSP processes (and will be used as P above).
For any given model there can be a number of properties
which need to be preserved. CSP theory enables us to de-
duce that if the model satisﬁes each property individually
then all properties are satisﬁed. It is important to be able
to split up the veriﬁcation into smaller parts because it is
impossible to model check unboundedly large systems all at
once in FDR.
2.2 Cryptography
Throughout the paper we make use of the following nota-
tion regarding cryptographic primitives. We use {m}PK (a)
to denote a message m encrypted under the public key of
agent a. The same agent possesses a corresponding secret
decryption key which is used to sign the message m. We de-
note this signed message using {m}SK (a). More commonly
the decryption key will be used to decipher an encrypted
message. It is also important to note that any agent can re-
cover the original message from a signed message using the
corresponding encryption key. We deﬁne this equivalence as
follows: {{m}PK (a)}SK (a) ≡ {{m}SK (a)}PK (a) ≡ m.
A speciﬁc occurrence of a message signed using an agent’s
secret key is the digital certiﬁcate {a,PK (a)}SK (t), con-
structed of the agent’s identity and their public key as signed
by the trusted certiﬁcation authority. Digital certiﬁcates
are sent between agents to indicate their public key and are
trusted by the receiver as the signature authenticates its
source as a trusted origin.
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Step.1 b → s : arg(c)
Step.2 s → b : {s,PK (s)}SK (t)
Step.3 b → s : {wm}PK (b)
Step.4 b → s : {{wm}SK (b)}PK (t)
Step.5 b → s : {b,PK (b)}SK (t)
Step.6 b → s : {H (arg(c))}SK (b)
Step.7 b → s : {H (wm, arg(c))}SK (b)
Step.8 s → t : {{wm}SK (b)}PK (t)
Step.9 s → t : {b,PK (b)}SK (t)
Step.10 t → s : {{wm}PK (b)}SK (t)
Step.11 s → b : {{[c ⊕ wm]WK (s)}PK (b)}SK (s)
Figure 1: Steps in Ibrahim et al. protocol
It is useful to have some way of denoting hash functions.
Let H (m) deﬁne a hash of the message m such that any
agent in possession of the message m is able to produce
the hash H (m). The opposite does not hold true i.e., no
agent is able to deduce m from H (m). We denote arg(c) to
be the unique identiﬁer of the cover material, c. Consider
it to be an image title, track name or, more generally, a
purchase order. Note that anyone in possession of the ﬁle
knows its title but knowing the title does not necessarily
mean possession of the ﬁle.
2.3 Watermarking
In order to include watermarking in this cryptography
notation we use [c ⊕ wm]WK (s) to denote the watermark
wm embedded in the cover material, c, using the water-
marking key of some seller WK (s). We need not concern
ourselves with the particular watermarking embedding al-
gorithm. Our analysis can be conducted independently of
it.
3. BUYER-SELLER WATERMARKING
PROTOCOLS
Qiao and Nahrstedt [10] ﬁrst identiﬁed the inadequacy
of watermarking procedures when considering customers’
rights. Memon and Wong [9] and subsequent work [1] [14]
proposed solutions to the customers’ rights problem along
with a growing set of other desirable security requirements.
Ibrahim et al. [6] proposed a single protocol to address a
number of issues, namely copy deterrence, customers’ rights,
unbinding, protocol practice applicability, conspiracy, buyer
participation, and man in the middle. Claims were made of
the security of the protocol without any formal veriﬁcation.
Three of the properties highlighted in the paper were triv-
ially satisﬁed by design. The remaining four properties are
summarised below. In Section 5, we will show the protocol
fails to preserve the unbinding property. Figure 1 is a step
by step representation of the protocol.
• Copy Deterrence
An honest seller must be able to trace piracy to the
dishonest buyer at the source of a leak.
• Customers’ Rights
An honest buyer requires assurance that a dishonest
seller cannot fabricate evidence of piracy by the buyer.
• Man-In-The-Middle
All honest agents involved in the protocol require that
no dishonest intruder is able to discover the cover ma-
terial, the buyer or seller’s watermark, watermarked
content or any watermarking and/or secret crypto-
graphic keys used, even if the intruder has full control
over the communication channels used as described.
• Unbinding
The unbinding problem in [7] describes the unique is-
sue that arises when a seller has intercepted a single
piece of cover material pirated by a semi-dishonest
buyer. The seller is thus able to extract the buyer’s
watermark and embed this within a number of other
pieces of cover material. This alone must not consti-
tute evidence of further piracy, a mechanism must be
put in place to bind the watermark to a speciﬁc piece
of cover material.
Ibrahim et al. [6] assume that a Trusted Certiﬁcation Au-
thority (CA) exists as a single trust pivot and that each
agent has received a digital certiﬁcate from the CA prior to
participation in the protocol. This digital certiﬁcate is made
up of the public key of the agent along with the agent’s name
all signed under the secret key of the CA. It is not necessary
for the CA to keep a record of all digital certiﬁcates as they
are returned to the CA in the protocol itself.
A buyer, b, initiates the protocol by sending a purchase
order, corresponding to a unique piece of cover material, to
a seller, s. This purchase order is deﬁned as the one way
function arg(c). Anyone in possession of the cover material
knows the associated arg(c) but the cover material cannot be
deduced when only the title is known. The seller proceeds to
send his own digital signature {s,PK (s)}SK (t) to the buyer
indicating receipt of the purchase order. The buyer must
store this signature so that they may verify the ﬁnal message
as authentic.
The buyer then sends the seller ﬁve further messages:-
1. The seller receives the buyer’s watermark encrypted
with the buyer’s public key {wm}PK (b). This will be
stored as it will be required in order to embed the
watermark wm into the cover material, c;
2. The watermark signed using the buyer’s watermarking
key and then encrypted under the public key of the
CA {{wm}SK (b)}PK (t). This will be used by the judge
during dispute resolution, after collaboration with the
CA, to deduce the buyer’s watermark without it being
necessary for the buyer to reveal it themselves;
3. The buyer’s digital certiﬁcate {b,PK (b)}SK (t). The
seller will use this to verify authentic origin of messages
signed using the buyer’s secret key and also encrypt
messages using the buyer’s public key ready for secure
transmission to the buyer;
4. The signed hash of the purchase order
{H (arg(c))}SK (b) is said to provide evidence that the
buyer made the purchase order;
5. A signed hash of the dual of the buyer’s watermark
and the argument {H (wm, arg(c))}SK (b) binding some
watermark wm to a particular purchase order arg(c).
The seller then proceeds to forward two of the messages
to the trusted CA, t . These are the buyer’s digital certiﬁ-
cate {b,PK (b)}SK (t) and the buyer’s signed watermark en-
crypted under the public key of the CA {{wm}SK (b)}PK (t).
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The CA has suﬃcient knowledge in order to strip oﬀ the lev-
els of cryptography, thus deducing the original watermark
wm. The CA then encrypts the watermark using the public
key of the buyer and signs it with his own private key i.e.,
{{wm}PK (b)}SK (t). Upon receiving this signed message the
seller is able to verify that the buyer’s watermark encrypted
with the buyer’s public key {wm}PK (b) received in step 3
matches the signed correspondence just received in step 10.
The seller is now ready to embed the watermark into
the cover material in the encrypted domain thus creating
{[c ⊕ wm]WK (s)}PK (b). Ibrahim et al. also discuss the em-
bedding of a second watermark used to index the ﬁle. This
enables the seller to identify exactly which entry to look up
in their database once a copy has been found rather than
conduct an intractable exhaustive search. Our original CSP
script included the seller’s watermark. However, we have
not included this additional embedding in the models within
this paper for the sake of simplicity as the analysis ﬁnds the
same attack regardless of whether this step is included or
excluded from the model.
Finally, in step 11, the seller signs the encrypted water-
marked document and sends this message,
{{[c ⊕ wm]WK (s)}PK (b)}SK (s), to the buyer. The buyer uses
the seller’s public key PK (s) deduced from his digital cer-
tiﬁcate {s,PK (s)}SK (t) to strip oﬀ the seller’s signature and
verify it did indeed originate from the seller and then uses
their own secret key SK (b) to decipher message into the wa-
termarked document, [c ⊕ wm]WK (s). Figure 1 shows each
step of the protocol.
The watermark embedding is conducted in the encrypted
domain using the privacy homomorphism property resulting
in equivalence 3. This is how the seller is able to conduct
the embedding without ever knowing the watermark.
{[c ⊕ wm]WK (s)}PK (b) ≡ [{c}PK (b) ⊕ {wm}PK (b)]WK (s)
The construction of the dual signature of the watermark
and purchase order aims to prohibit the seller from trans-
planting a watermark from one piece of cover material into
another provided both are purchased by the same buyer
which assumes the protocol will be run multiple times for
multiple transactions. It also assumes that more than a sin-
gle buyer will use the protocol to purchase digital content.
The protocol must remain secure for more than just a single
run. Our analysis in Section 5 shows that an attack can be
made when running two consecutive runs of the protocol.
4. THE MODEL
In order to build a formal model of the protocol behaviour
we must have deﬁned datatypes and all the agents of the
protocol. Each agent modelled can be described as a sep-
arate CSP process. As will be shown later, we also use
the notion of an inference engine which is a simpliﬁcation
of Roscoe’s deductive system [11] that enables a fact to be
deduced from a set of facts. Figure 2 illustrates how a buyer-
seller watermarking protocol is modelled as above, and how
we subsequently reason about the model.
4.1 Defining Data Types
The set messages is the set of all messages that pass be-
tween agents. We note from Figure 1 that there are diﬀerent
message formats in the 11 steps of the protocol. Some steps
use the same message format, for example, steps 2, 5 and
9. Each message format, messagei , is deﬁned separately and
Figure 2: Adopted Workflow
message1 = {arg(c) |c ← covermaterial}
message2 = {{a,PK (a)}SK (t) |a ← agents,
t ← thirdpartys}
message3 = {{wm}PK (b) |b ← buyers,
wm ← watermarks}
message4 = {{{wm}SK (b)}PK (t) |t ← thirdpartys,
b ← buyers,
wm ← watermarks}
message5 = {{H (arg(c))}SK (b) |c ← covermaterial ,
b ← buyers}
message6 = {{H (wm, arg(c))}SK (b) |b ← buyers,
wm ← watermarks,
c ← covermaterial}
message7 = {{{wm}PK (b)}SK (t) |b ← buyers,
t ← thirdpartys,
wm ← watermarks}
message8 = {{{[c ⊕ wm]WK (s)}PK (b)}SK (s)
|b ← buyers,
s ← sellers,
c ← covermaterial ,
wm ← watermarks}
message9 = {[c ⊕ wm]WK (s) |s ← sellers,
c ← covermaterial ,
wm ← watermarks}
messages =
⋃
i∈1..9messagei
Figure 3: Message types
these combined to form the set messages as shown in Fig-
ure 3. Messages 1 to 8 are the message formats for use in
the Ibrahim et al. watermark generation/insertion proto-
col. While, message9 denotes the unencrypted watermarked
document that a buyer may subsequently illegally distribute
over some ﬁle sharing network.
4.2 Protocol Agents
Each agent involved in a protocol run both sends and re-
ceives messages. We deﬁne a parameterised process,
HONEST BUYER(b, . . .), denoting the buyer b in terms
of eight events representing the messages sent and received.
These eight events match the ﬁrst seven steps along with
step 11 in Figure 1, i.e., all the steps of the protocol in which
the buyer participates. For example, {H (wm, arg(c))}SK (b)
symbolises b sending to seller s the dual signature of the
watermark wm and the purchase order arg(c). The overall
deﬁnition of the buyer depends on whether the buyer chooses
to complete an honest run of the protocol or share pre-
viously purchased watermarked content. The share event,
share.b.s.k , where k is some watermarked document, signi-
ﬁes b releasing the watermarked document onto some open
ﬁle sharing network in the knowledge that sellers may be
208
monitoring. The watermark document k is drawn from the
set known, which is the set of all watermarked content pre-
viously purchased by b. The full description of a buyer is
given in Figure 4.
BUYER (b, known) =

s∈sellers
t∈thirdpartys
c∈covermaterial
wm∈watermarks
⎛
⎝ HONEST BUYER(b, s, t , c,wm, known)
share.b.s?k ∈ known → BUYER(b, known)
⎞
⎠
HONEST BUYER(b, s, t , c,wm, known) =⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
comm.b.s.arg(c) →
comm.s.b.{s,PK (s)}SK (t) →
comm.b.s.{wm}PK (b) →
comm.b.s.{{wm}SK (b)}PK (t) →
comm.b.s.{b,PK (b)}SK (t) →
comm.b.s.{H (arg(c))}SK (b) →
comm.b.s.{H (wm, arg(c))}SK (b) →
comm.s.b.{{[c ⊕ wm]WK (s)}PK (b)}SK (s) →
BUYER(b, known ∪ [c ⊕ wm]WK (s))
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Figure 4: Buyer Description in CSP
We deﬁne a parameterised process,
HONEST SELLER(s, . . .), denoting the seller s in terms
of eleven events. This process describes every message ex-
changed in the protocol because the seller participates in
every step. The overall deﬁnition of the seller is similar to
the buyer. The seller is also willing to participate in an hon-
est run of the protocol or listen in on the share channel so
that they may retrieve any illegally distributed watermarked
content. The full description of a seller is given in Figure 5.
SELLER(s) =

b∈buyers
t∈thirdpartys
c∈covermaterial
wm∈watermarks
⎛
⎝ HONEST SELLER(s, b, t , c,wm)
share.b.s.[c ⊕ wm]WK (s) → SELLER(s)
⎞
⎠
HONEST SELLER(s, b, t , c,wm) =⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
comm.b.s.arg(c) →
comm.s.b.{s,PK (s)}SK (t) →
comm.b.s.{wm}PK (b) →
comm.b.s.{{wm}SK (b)}PK (t) →
comm.b.s.{b,PK (b)}SK (t) →
comm.b.s.{H (arg(c))}SK (b) →
comm.b.s.{H (wm, arg(c))}SK (b) →
comm.s.t .{{wm}SK (b)}PK (t) →
comm.s.t .{b,PK (b)}SK (t) →
comm.t .s.{{wm}PK (b)}SK (t) →
comm.s.b.{{[c ⊕ wm]WK (s)}PK (b)}SK (s) →
SELLER(s)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
Figure 5: Seller Description in CSP
We also construct a process of all the events in which some
trusted CA t participates. We model steps 8, 9 and 10 of the
protocol, as the process TRUSTED THIRD PARTY (t),
describing the interactions with any seller regarding any
buyer’s purchase.
TRUSTED THIRD PARTY (t) =

b∈buyers
s∈sellers
wm∈watermarks
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
comm.s.t .{{wm}SK (b)}PK (t) →
comm.s.t .{b, PK (b)}SK (t) →
comm.t .s.{{wm}PK (b)}SK (t) →
TRUSTED THIRD PARTY (t)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
Figure 6: Trusted Third Party Description in CSP
4.3 Overall Network
The process NETWORK is a composition of the BUYER,
SELLER and TRUSTED THIRD PARTY processes that
synchronise on each of the events they may perform. For
example, each time BUYER(b) performs
comm.b.s.arg(c), SELLER(s) must also perform this same
event. Each process is initiated with concrete parameters,
BUYER with Bob and the empty set ∅, SELLER with Sam
and the
TRUSTED THIRD PARTY with Tom.
The NETWORK process is a complete description of a
simple system of transactions in which just a single buyer,
Bob, may purchase watermarked content from a single seller
whom communicates with a single CA, Tom. Multiple pur-
chases may be made consecutively but not simultaneously.
The buyer, Bob, initially owns no watermarked content thus
the known parameter is equivalent to the empty set ∅. Fig-
ure 7 illustrates our NETWORK process. In general we
would construct a network made up of several buyers and
sellers: but the NETWORK process we have deﬁned is suf-
ﬁcient in ﬁnding an attack.
NETWORK=
BUYER(Bob, ∅)
‖ SELLER(Sam)
‖ TRUSTED THIRD PARTY (Tom)
Figure 7: Overall Network Description in CSP
4.4 Inference Engine
In order to analyse the model of the network we need to
augment our model with additional observable events. We
must be able to track these events so that evidence may be
gathered regarding transactions. We want to deﬁne an in-
telligent seller that is able to build up knowledge by making
deductions based on all messages that the seller receives over
any channel. We model this as a separate process that listens
in on incoming messages sent to the seller along the comm
and share channels. The learn event enables the intelligent
seller to listen in on communications sent to the buyer al-
lowing him to build up his knowledge. The intelligent seller
is deﬁned using the following three events:-
• learn is the event that enables the intelligent seller to
expand his knowledge by learning the messages that
have been sent to the seller
• infer models the deductive behaviour of the intelligent
seller who is able to build up further knowledge by
making inferences using existing knowledge
• sellerknows enables us to observe when the knowledge
built up by the intelligent seller constitutes evidence
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Figure 8: Overview of CSP process structure
The intelligent seller’s initial knowledge is given in the set
initialknowledge and consists of all agents, each agent’s pub-
lic key, all cover material, the seller’s secret key and the
seller’s watermarking key.
initialknowledge =agents ∪ {PK (a) | a ← agents} ∪
{SK (Sam),WK (Sam)} ∪ covermaterial
The intelligent seller’s knowledge extends as new messages
are received and inferences are made. Knowledge built up
only constitutes evidence when it is also an element of the
evidence set deﬁned below. This is the set of all possi-
ble embedded documents and dual signatures binding wa-
termarks to purchase orders. Evidence is released along
the sellerknows channel so that we may observe when this
knowledge has been deduced for use in the analysis.
evidence ={[c ⊕ wm]WK (s), {H (wm,arg(c))}SK (b)|
b ← buyers, c ← covermaterial ,
wm ← watermarks}
We then deﬁne the overall system as the NETWORK run
in parallel with the INTELLIGENT SELLER. This overall
system is illustrated by Figure 8, which identiﬁes the events
involved when running the processes concurrently.
SYSTEM = NETWORK ‖ INTELLIGENT SELLER
5. ANALYSIS
Having constructed our model in machine readable CSP
we use the FDR model checker to test whether assertions
made about the model hold true. In order to prosecute a
dishonest buyer the seller must gather two pieces of evi-
dence. The buyer must have the signed hash of the dual
{H (wm, arg(c))}SK (b) that binds the watermark to a spe-
ciﬁc piece of cover material and also the corresponding wa-
termarked document [c ⊕ wm]WK (s). To protect the cus-
tomers’ rights, the same argument must hold in the oppo-
site direction. That is, a dishonest seller must not be in
possession of both pieces of evidence if an honest buyer has
not illegally distributed the material. We analyse our model
against this single requirement, which is a necessary test of
the customers’ rights and resistance to unbinding properties,
SPEC (b, s, c,wm) =⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
sellerknows.{H (wm, arg(c))}SK (b) →
SPEC1(b, s, c,wm)

sellerknows.[c ⊕ wm]WK (s) →
SPEC2(b, s, c,wm)

share.b.s.[c ⊕ wm]WK (s) →
ARB(b, s, c,wm)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
SPEC1 (b, s, c,wm) =
sellerknows.{H (wm, arg(c))}SK (b) →
SPEC1(b, s, c,wm)

share.b.s.[c ⊕ wm]WK (s) →
ARB(b, s, c,wm)
SPEC2 (b, s, c,wm) =
sellerknows.[c ⊕ wm]WK (s) →
SPEC2(b, s, c,wm)

share.b.s.[c ⊕ wm]WK (s) →
ARB(b, s, c,wm)
ARB(b, s, c,wm) =
sellerknows.{H (wm, arg(c))}SK (b) →
ARB(b, s, c,wm)

sellerknows.[c ⊕ wm]WK (s) →
ARB(b, s, c,wm)

share.b.s.[c ⊕ wm]WK (s) →
ARB(b, s, c,wm)
Figure 9: Specification of desired property
but not suﬃcient for a thorough veriﬁcation of the protocol’s
security. We do not consider the other security properties
in this paper, for example, security against a man-in-the-
middle attack.
Our analysis shows that the protocol by Ibrahim et al.
fails to satisfy this requirement, thus we say that the pro-
tocol is insecure. The requirement fails to be satisﬁed due
to the unbinding attack, given in Figure 10, such that the
customers’ rights are preserved as described in Section 3.
We ﬁrst describe this requirement as a CSP speciﬁcation,
SPEC (b, s, c,wm), given in Figure 9. It is broken down
into three separate processes. SPEC1 says that if the ﬁle
has been illegally distributed once along the share channel,
evidence gathering along with further illegal sharing of the
same ﬁle may then happen arbitrarily as described by the
process ARB . Otherwise, if at ﬁrst, one piece of evidence is
gathered, the alternative piece of evidence must not be gath-
ered until the ﬁle has been illegally distributed, although the
ﬁrst piece of evidence may be collected over and over again.
These behaviours are described by SPEC2 and SPEC3 col-
lectively.
We then use trace reﬁnement and let FDR automatically
check whether our protocol model SYSTEM reﬁnes our spec-
iﬁcation SPEC . Therefore, we specify that the following
assertion must hold for any buyer and any seller, who par-
ticipate in the various consecutive runs of the protocol, and
for any watermark and piece of cover material, chosen by
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α.1 Bob → Sam : arg(C1)
α.2 Sam→Bob : {Sam,PK (Sam)}SK (Tom)
α.3 Bob → Sam : {{WM }SK (Bob)}PK (Tom)
α.4 Bob → Sam : {WM }PK (Bob)
α.5 Bob → Sam : {Bob,PK (Bob)}SK (Tom)
α.6 Bob → Sam : {H (arg(C1))}SK (Bob)
α.7 Bob → Sam : {H (WM , arg(C1))}SK (Bob)
α.8 Sam→Tom : {{WM }SK (Bob)}PK (Tom)
α.9 Sam→Tom : {Bob,PK (Bob)}SK (Tom)
α.10 Tom→ Sam : {{WM }PK (Bob)}SK (Tom)
α.11 Sam→Bob : {{[C1 ⊕WM ]WK (Sam)}PK (Bob)}SK (Sam)
α.share Bob → Sam : [C1⊕WM ]WK (Sam)
β.1 Bob → Sam : arg(C2)
β.2 Sam→Bob : {Sam,PK (Sam)}SK (Tom)
β.3 Bob → Sam : {{WM }SK (Bob)}PK (Tom)
β.4 Bob → Sam : {{WM }SK (Bob)}PK (Tom)
β.5 Bob → Sam : {Bob,PK (Bob)}SK (Tom)
β.6 Bob → Sam : {H (arg(C2))}SK (Bob)
β.7 Bob → Sam : {H (WM , arg(C2))}SK (Bob)
Figure 10: Counter Example of Unbinding Attack
the buyers; achieved below using indexed parallel.
‖
b∈buyers
s∈sellers
c∈covermaterial
wm∈watermarks
SPEC (b, s, c,wm)  SYSTEM \ {| comm |}
If the statement is found to be true the model is shown to
be resilient to unbinding. Our analysis reveals that the pro-
tocol does not satisfy the property. An appropriate counter
example is provided in Figure 10.
The counter example, involving two consecutive runs, il-
lustrates one such instance where the security requirement
has been breached. An initial run α of the protocol is com-
pleted between the buyer, Bob, and the seller, Sam, in which
the buyer purchases the cover material, C1, embedded with
their chosen watermark, WM . The buyer then proceeds to
illegally distribute the ﬁle in step α.share. Subsequently, a
second protocol β runs through to step 7 between the same
buyer, Bob, and seller, Sam, with Bob choosing to use the
same watermark but requesting new content, C2.
Following each of the steps of the attack in Figure 10 Sam
is able to gather the evidence required to prove that Bob
has illegally redistributed a watermarked document with-
out Bob having ever shared this ﬁle. At step 7 Sam re-
ceives {H (WM , arg(C2))}SK (Bob). By step 7 Sam is also
able to construct [C2⊕WM ]WK (Sam) like so: once the ﬁrst
piece of content has been illegally distributed by Bob, Sam
has in his possession [C1 ⊕WM ]WK (Sam) and WK (Sam).
Hence, Sam is able to extract the watermark WM (using
one of the deduction rules given in the Appendix). Sam
also knows the cover material C2 and can therefore infer
[C2 ⊕WM ]WK (Sam) (using the same deduction rule). By
deducing these two pieces of evidence, Sam is able to prove
that Bob has illegally redistributed [C2⊕WM ]WK (Sam) with-
out Bob having ever shared this watermarked document.
The impact of the attack can be explained as follows: the
buyer Bob purchases 1,000 ﬁles from the seller Sam each
one embedded with the same watermark. Bob then illegally
distributes multiple copies of all 1,000 ﬁles. Sam may subse-
quently retrieve any number of these ﬁles. Sam is only able
α.1 Bob →Sam : arg(C1)
α.2 Sam→Bob : {Sam,PK (Sam)}SK (Tom)
α.3 Bob →Sam : {{WM 1}SK (Bob)}PK (Tom)
α.4 Bob →Sam : {WM 1}PK (Bob)
α.5 Bob →Sam : {Bob,PK (Bob)}SK (Tom)
α.6 Bob →Sam : {H (arg(C1))}SK (Bob)
α.7 Bob →Sam : {H (WM 2, arg(C2))}SK (Bob)
α.8 Sam→Tom : {{WM 1}SK (Bob)}PK (Tom)
α.9 Sam→Tom : {Bob,PK (Bob)}SK (Tom)
α.10 Tom→Sam : {{WM 1}PK (Bob)}SK (Tom)
α.11 Sam→Bob : {{[C1⊕WM 1]WK (Sam)}PK (Bob)}SK (Sam)
α.share Bob →Sam : [C1⊕WM 1]WK (Sam)
Figure 11: Alternative Unbinding Attack
to prove that at least one of the 1,000 ﬁles has been illegally
redistributed. Sam is unable to prove how many have been
copied or identify which particular ﬁles. This is not suﬃ-
cient evidence to prosecute Bob even though he was indeed
acting maliciously. It is therefore in Bob’s interest to choose
the same watermark in each run of the protocol. To protect
the seller from such an attack the protocol must not allow a
buyer to use the same watermark twice.
6. ALTERNATIVE UNBINDING ATTACK
The protocol is vulnerable to another attack. In this sec-
tion we describe the attack and propose a modiﬁcation to
the protocol which solves the problem.
A dishonest buyer can send false data in step 7 of the pro-
tocol illustrated in Figure 11. Here the values for the wa-
termark and/or purchase order do not match the data sent
in the previous run. However, the seller cannot construct
the message {H (WM 2, arg(C2))}SK (Bob) from his current
knowledge and is therefore unable to detect that the water-
mark WM 2 and/or purchase order arg(C2) do not match
data sent in previous steps. The seller is therefore unable to
build a case against against the dishonest buyer, even if the
buyer has illegally shared the watermarked document, as he
is unable to gather both of the pieces of evidence required
for prosecution.
As in the previous attack, by enabling unbinding in the
protocol the buyer is able to avoid prosecution. Even if
multiple illegal copies are made of multiple ﬁles, the seller is
only able to prove that at least one watermarked document
has been illegally distributed. He cannot prove how many of
the purchased ﬁles have been copied or identify speciﬁcally
which documents.
The attack is possible only because the seller is unable
to verify the dual signature {H (wm, arg(c))}SK (b) received
in step 7 of the protocol. We modify this dual signature
into something that the seller can verify during the proto-
col run. By replacing the watermark, wm, with the water-
mark as encrypted with the buyer’s public key, {wm}PK (b),
the attack can be avoided. The seller is able to construct
and verify the hash value, held within this new dual sig-
nature {H ({wm}PK (b), arg(c))}SK (b), using the other veriﬁ-
able information he receives in the protocol run, speciﬁcally
{wm}PK (b) and arg(c).
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7. DISCUSSION AND FURTHER WORK
In this paper we provided a novel approach to the anal-
ysis of buyer-seller watermarking protocols. We tailored an
existing formal analysis technique, used previously to anal-
yse communications and security protocols, to model the
buyer-seller watermarking protocol as proposed by Ibrahim
et al. We accurately represented their protocol by construct-
ing a model using the process algebra CSP. By utilising the
tool support associated with CSP we were able to conduct a
thorough analysis of all the possible behaviour of the model.
An unbinding attack on the protocol was discovered during
the analysis and we have shown the counter example that
was automatically generated by FDR in order to illustrate
this attack. A second unbinding attack was described and
revisions to both vulnerabilities were proposed in this paper.
Our protocol model can be extended, and additional spec-
iﬁcations deﬁned, in order to analyse the other properties as
described by Ibrahim et al. We have modelled the proto-
col by Memon and Wong [9] in the same manner and our
analysis reaﬃrmed the unbinding attack described in [7].
We are currently modelling and analysing other buyer-seller
watermarking protocols that claim to satisfy a growing list
of desirable security requirements. Our future work will ex-
amine how to provide a proof of such security properties
in the general case, i.e. where the proof is independent of
the number of participants and of particular cover material
and watermarks. This will include reasoning about multi-
ple runs of the protocol made by multiple agents of each
type both consecutively and concurrently. This work is to
be part of our longer term goal to develop a framework for
CSP modelling of buyer-seller watermarking protocols.
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APPENDIX
A. FURTHER DETAILS OF DEDUCTIVE
SYSTEM IN CSP
In this section we present the deductive process
INTELLIGENT SELLER which augments the model of the
network so that we may analyse the overall behaviour of the
system. We simplify Roscoe’s lazy spy model [11] used in
the analysis of the Needham Schroeder Public Key protocol.
We no longer use the Dolev Yao model [4] used by Roscoe
to model an outside intruder but instead construct an intel-
ligent seller as illustrated in Figure 8.
Unlike Roscoe’s lazy spy the intelligent seller cannot in-
tercept or fabricate messages. The intelligent seller can only
act passively, listening in to communications sent to the
seller and making inferences about the information he at-
tains. The intelligent seller is given the initial knowledge and
a set of deduction rules let him break down a message se-
quence into its composite parts, encrypt/decrypt messages,
embed/extract watermarks and hash messages. The intelli-
gent seller then releases messages along the
sellerknows channel once some knowledge learnt constitutes
evidence, predeﬁned in the evidence set. This communica-
tion on sellerknows enables us to make necessary observa-
tions during analysis. Similar to Roscoe’s lazy spy model,
INTELLIGENT SELLER is deﬁned in this manner to min-
imise issues caused by state space explosion.
deductions1(X ) ={({Sq .m}, nth(j ,m)),
({nth(i ,m) |i ← {0..#m − 1}}, Sq .m) |
Sq .m ← X , j ← {0..#m − 1}}
deductions2(X ) = {({m,PK (a)}, {m}PK (a)),
({{m}PK (a),SK (a)},m),
({{m}SK (a),SK (a)},m) |
m ← message, a ←, agents,
{m}PK (a) ← X }
deductions3(X ) = {({c,wm,WK (s)}, [c ⊕ wm]WK (s)),
({[c ⊕ wm]WK (s),WK (s)}, c),
({[c ⊕ wm]WK (s),WK (s)},wm) |
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c ← covermaterial ,
wm ← watermarks,
s ← sellers,
[c ⊕ wm]WK (s) ← X }
deductions4(X ) = {({m},H (m)) |
m ← messages,H (m)← X }
deductions5(X ) = {({c}, arg(c)) |
c ← covermaterial , arg(c) ← X }
deductions(X ) =
⋃
i∈1..5 deductionsi (X )
allfacts =
⋃
{explode(m) |
m ← messages}
alldeductions = deductions(allfacts)
possiblebasicknowledge = known ∪messages
knowablefacts = Close(possiblebasicknowledge)
learnablefacts = knowablefacts − known
Deductions = {(X , f ) |(X , f ) ← alldeductions,
f ∈ learnablefacts,
f ∈ X ,X − knowablefacts = ∅}
initialknowledge =agents ∪ {PK (a) | a ← agents} ∪
{SK (Sam),WK (Sam)} ∪ covermaterial
known =Close(initialknowledge)
evidence ={[c ⊕ wm]WK (s), {H (wm,arg(c))}SK (b)|
b ← buyers, c ← covermaterial ,
wm ← watermarks}
IGNORANTOF (f )=
〈f ∈ messages〉learn.f → KNOWS(f )

(infer?t ∈ {(X , f ′) |(X , f ′) ← Deductions, f ′ = f }
→ KNOWS(f ))
KNOWS(f ) =
〈f ∈ messages〉learn.f → KNOWS(f )
(infer?t ∈ {(X , f ′) | (X , f ′) ← Deductions, f ∈ X }
→ KNOWS(f ))
 〈f ∈ evidence〉sellerknows.f → KNOWS(f ))
LEARNKNOWN = (learn?f ∈ known ∩messages
→ LEARNKNOWN )
LEARN = chase(( ‖
f∈learnablefacts
IGNORANTOF (f ))\{| infer |})
INTELLIGENT SELLER =
(LEARN ||| LEARNKNOWN )
comm, share/learn, learn
SYSTEM = NETWORK ‖ INTELLIGENT SELLER
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